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Justice for Large Earlobes! A Comment
on Richard Arneson’s “What Is
Wrongful Discrimination?”

ANDREW KOPPELMAN*

Suppose that we have nothing to eat but canned tomatoes, and that we
need to open the cans somehow. You suggest that a good way to open
the cans would be to hit them with a sledgehammer. One way of
responding would be to show you a can opener, explain how it works,
and compare the likely results of using the can opener versus the
sledgehammer. Of course, there is another strategy: let you use the
sledgehammer and see what happens. After you take a whack at the
problem, you probably will be ready to consider other methods.
Richard Arneson’s paper, “What Is Wrongful Discrimination?,” is
(perhaps unintentionally) an example of this second strategy. At
different points in his paper, Professor Arneson offers two inconsistent
descriptions of what his paper tries to accomplish. The first is to answer
his title question.1 The second is to answer that question within “a
deontological morality that holds, contrary to act consequentialism, that
what is morally right and wrong . . . is fixed by . . . . moral constraints
[which] mainly take the form of moral rights of others that are
correlative with moral obligations that one must not violate these
rights.”2 In a footnote, Professor Arneson explains that this assumed
* Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University School of
Law. Thanks to Richard Arneson and Kim Yuracko for helpful comments on an earlier
draft.
1. Richard Arneson, What Is Wrongful Discrimination?, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
775 (2006).
2. Id. at 778-79.
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moral framework “is not the one I would ultimately endorse. The
project of this essay is to explore what one should hold about
discrimination, given that one adheres to a deontological morality.”3 In
other words, he is going to try to do the job with a tool that he thinks is
flawed. He is not going to show us how to open the can. He is going to
show us how to open the can with a sledgehammer. It is therefore
unsurprising⎯and not necessarily a criticism of Professor Arneson⎯that
the exercise is messy and results in less nourishment than we might have
hoped for.
Within the deontological framework, Professor Arneson suggests, one
should hold that “[d]iscrimination that is intrinsically morally wrong
occurs when an agent treats a person identified as being of a certain type
differently than she otherwise would have done because of unwarranted
animus or prejudice against persons of that type.”4 “Animus is hostility
or, more broadly, a negative attitude, an aversion.”5 Prejudice is “faulty
belief,” which means not simply “responding to individuals on the basis
of statistical indicators their broad characteristics suggest,” but specifically
“beliefs . . . formed in some culpably defective way,” as for example if
“I simply am . . . lazy in forming beliefs.”6
Professor Arneson defends his view against Judith Thomson’s claim
that an action’s moral permissibility can be fully assessed on the basis of
a thin description of that action, unencumbered by whether the agent
would be at fault if he did it or with what intention the agent would do
the action if he were to do it.7 Intentions, he argues, might render
morally wrong an otherwise permissible action. He then considers some
possible thin description accounts of wrongful discrimination, for
example, a right of the most qualified applicant to be selected for a job,
and shows that they will not adequately capture the wrongfulness that
we are after.
After filling out his conception of wrongful discrimination, Arneson
shows that this conception is not very helpful in determining which
kinds of discrimination are particularly wrongful. The definition can
encompass, for example, discrimination against persons with large
3. Id. at 778 n.7.
4. Id. at 779.
5. Id. at 787.
6. Id. at 779, 787-89. This part of Arneson’s paper is under-theorized. What
would it mean to be reprehensibly lazy in forming one’s beliefs? Accuracy has costs.
Everyone believes things on the basis of dubious hearsay, if only because it is not worth
the trouble to investigate further. Some further account—which probably will turn on
the kinds of considerations of historical and cultural context that I emphasize at the end
of this paper—is necessary before we can know what sometimes makes otherwise
normal laziness reprehensible.
7. Id. at 779-84.
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earlobes if done with animus or prejudice.8 The upshot is that “clarifying
the idea of wrongful discrimination is not going to do much heavy lifting
for the task of determining what social justice requires with respect to
policies for dealing with suspect classifications.”9 He surveys discrimination
based on age, sex, sexual orientation, and beauty or ugliness to show that
they “pose radically separate and distinct questions of justice that require
remedies specifically attuned to each type of classification’s particular
set of issues.”10 So, Arneson concludes, “the antidiscrimination norm
does not help in formulating policies which adequately respond to the
motley of issues we face.”11
I agree with Professor Arneson that the antidiscrimination norm he
formulates is not much help in deciding concrete discrimination issues.
However, unless better tools can be shown, the case for the sledgehammer
has not been refuted. Everything he says can be admitted, and the
deontologist can still respond, “Well, Richard, do you want the tomatoes
or not?”
The crucial flaw in deontology as Professor Arneson conceives it is
that it considers the discriminator in isolation: wrongful discrimination is
identified wholly in terms of the discriminator’s defective intentions.
Social context disappears from the analysis. According to Arneson,
discrimination against people with large earlobes, if based on animus or
prejudice, is indistinguishable from discrimination against AfricanAmericans.
Because Arneson focuses so tightly on the discriminator’s intentions,
the discrimination itself disappears from his analysis. His description in
defining the wrongful conduct is as thin as anything Thomson proposes,
but unlike Thomson, Arneson focuses on the perpetrator’s mental state
rather than the discriminator’s external conduct. It is not clear that he
needs to look at external conduct at all. I can unfairly subject a person to
my unwarranted animus simply by scowling at them, unnoticed, as they
8. Id. at 796.
9. Id.
10. Id. This part of the paper is itself encumbered by unfortunate stereotypes, as
when he asks us to suppose that “in a sexually tolerant society, gay men are not
significantly involved in the childrearing, on the whole and on the average.” Id. at 802.
The 2000 Census found that, of the nearly 600,000 same-sex couples who reported
themselves as “unmarried partners,” children were present in 34% of lesbian couples and
22% of gay male couples. For comparative purposes, consider that Census also found
46% of married heterosexual couples were raising children. SEAN CAHILL, SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 43-46 (2004).
11. Arneson, supra note 1, at 796.
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pass by my window. Perhaps such scowling is intrinsically wrong in all
contexts. But discrimination thus understood has little to do with the
kind of discrimination in which most of us are interested. If all
discrimination were of that kind, then it is unlikely that anyone would
have bothered to organize this symposium.
Professor Arneson is right that thick description is what is needed, but
the description we need is thicker than the one he describes. At the end
of his paper, he describes the larger project as “liberating society from
the social pathologies inherited from past caste hierarchies (and about
preventing the rise of new invidious caste hierarchies) . . . .”12 Yet his
account of wrongful discrimination has no necessary place for history or
culture. Any account of discrimination that does not rely on history
or culture will be a poor tool for the job of identifying wrongful
discrimination.
If one examines the prevailing theories of antidiscrimination law, one
finds that some focus, as Professor Arneson does, on the process by
which discriminatory decisions get made, some focus on discrimination’s
stigmatizing message, and some focus on the bad tangible results. All
capture a part of the problem.
Process theory, which focuses on racism’s contaminating effect on the
way in which decisions get made, is the type of approach that Professor
Arneson has offered us. It focuses on the decisionmaking process to see
whether that process is contaminated by unwarranted animus or
prejudice. As we have seen, this approach has difficulty distinguishing
racism from earlobe discrimination. Yet at the same time, it depends on
this very distinction: Professor Arneson’s paper implicitly relies on race
as the paradigmatic case of discrimination from which he wants to
generalize. Process theory thus points beyond itself toward a larger
problem that lets us understand why some kinds of discrimination are
especially problematic.
That larger context is the focus of result-based theories. But those
theories, too, are incomplete. A theory that focuses on stigma fails to
specify which sorts of stigma are impermissible and why. A stigmafocused theory also points beyond itself to a larger social reality in
which stigma is inscribed and reproduced. Group-disadvantage theories
focus directly on social reality. But if we only look at material disadvantage,
we lose sight of any specific concern about discrimination. In order to
capture this, we must pay attention to process. The search for the central

12.
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project of antidiscrimination law thus moves in a circle. Each theory is
incomplete and points toward one of the others.13
The theories are thus connected because each of them identifies one
moment in a process by which inequality is institutionalized. In the
decisionmaking process, stigmatic meanings such as racism (which wrongly
attributes inferior worth to some people) are externalized into the world.
Once externalized, they become objective in a distribution of prestige (or
lack thereof), power, and tangible goods. Through the experience of this
objective reality, society’s members internalize the meanings anew.
Each theory focuses on one of the moments through which a stigmatizing
reality reproduces itself.14 Process theorists focus on the moment of
externalization, when stigmatizing meanings manifest themselves in
decisionmaking. Group-disadvantage theorists focus on the moment of
objectivation, the concrete reality that these meanings create. Stigma
theorists focus on the moment of internalization, when the meanings are
absorbed by the participants in the culture. Strictly speaking, none of
these theories are wrong; indeed, all have part of the beast in their grip.
Moreover, because each of these moments is necessary to the meaningproducing process, the disruption of any one of them would help derange
the process.
One can better fight the beast if one can see it whole. Each of the
three diagnoses of the problem points to an aspiration that cannot be
realized if only that particular symptom is addressed. Repairing the
decisionmaking process is impossible without sealing off the source of
the contamination. The contamination’s source turns out to be the racism
entrenched within the larger culture in which the process is situated.
Racial stigma cannot be ended without changing the social facts in which
that stigma is inscribed and which in turn daily reinscribe it. Material
inequalities cannot be addressed without changing the process by which
they are generated and legitimated. All three theories point toward a
larger problem, one that is deeply embedded in our culture.
Each of us, in our daily activities, constitute the culture in which we
live, and to that extent each of us has the ability, and therefore the
13. The claims I make here are defended in detail in ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 1-114 (1996).
14. Descriptions of the wrongs of discrimination can, of course, be disaggregated
even further. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination
Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519,
519-20 (2001).
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obligation, to reshape that culture. This means that we have an obligation to
avoid racial discrimination that does not apply to discrimination against
those with large earlobes. It is true, as Professor Arneson says, that
different kinds of discrimination present different issues. But it is
possible to say more than that, and to note some unifying themes. What
unites discrimination against African-Americans, women, and gay
people is that they are all, in American culture, subject to discrimination
based on a belief that they are less worthy and deserving than others, and
that by virtue of their status, their welfare matters less than that of
others.15
Finally, both Professor Arneson and I have been very hard on
deontology here, so let me end with a few words on deontology’s behalf.
There is nothing in the structure of deontology that demands that it be
indifferent to the issues of social context raised in this essay. The
premier minimal-state deontologist is Robert Nozick, for whom we have
no obligations other than the avoidance of force and fraud.16 But even
Nozick cannot be indifferent to whether prejudice infects the culture.
Nozick is as devoted to state impartiality as any process theorist, and so
cannot tolerate racism, even unconscious racism, in government
decisionmaking.17 In a culture in which racism, conscious or unconscious,
is pervasive, government decisionmakers who have internalized that
racism will be incapable of neutrality, even with respect to the minimal
range of government functions that Nozick deems legitimate. Killers of
blacks will receive less harsh treatment than killers of whites. Thugs who
attack gay people may not be sanctioned at all. Rape and sexual harassment
of women will not be taken seriously by the state. Transformation of the
culture is necessary if impartial government decisionmaking is to become
a reality. If, as Nozick thinks, people in the state of nature have good
reason to establish an impartial state, then they have equally good reason
to purge their culture of pervasive prejudice.18 And this can generate an

15. Here this is only a summary assertion. For extensive supporting arguments,
see KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 115-76; Andrew Koppelman, Are the Boy Scouts
Being As Bad As Racists?: Judging the Scouts’ Antigay Policy, 18 PUB. AFF. Q. 363,
364-73 (2004).
16. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing
that the nonviolation of individual rights serves as a moral constraint on action rather
than as an end state to be achieved). However, Nozick’s libertarianism is an unattractive
position. See THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 15-62 (1989) (arguing that Nozick’s
institutional scheme “is not sensitive to what sort of social world his ground rules would
tend to engender given full compliance . . . .”). Moreover, in his later work Nozick
abandons his libertarian position. See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-96
(1989).
17. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 13, at 182.
18. See id. at 172, 183-84.
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obligation not to discriminate.19 Where this obligation obtains will depend
on history and culture: there will be reason to worry about racism that is
not present with the occasional idiosyncratic prejudice against those with
large earlobes. Perhaps deontology is not such a sledgehammer after all.

19.

See id. at 181-90.
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